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Abstract: 
 
This paper argues that immigration can help to alleviate the burden ageing presents for 
the welfare states of most Western Economies. We develop a macroeconomic framework 
which deals with the impact of both ageing and immigration on economic growth. This is 
combined with a detailed model of the labour market, to include the interaction with low-
skilled unemployment. The empirical relevance of some crucial model assumptions is 
shown to hold for the Netherlands, 1973 – 2009. The conclusions are that immigration 
will help to alleviate the ageing problem, as long as the immigrants will be able to 
participate in the labour force at least as much as the native population. Moreover, the 
better educated the immigrants are or become, the higher their contribution to growth will 
be. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Various studies have argued that immigration can contribute to solve a lack of labour 
supply that results from an ageing population – EU (2005), Freeman (2006). This notion 
also underlies the recent EU immigration policy, which includes the introduction of the 
‘blue card’ to attract highly skilled workers mid-2011 (for a critical discussion see Parkes 
and Angenendt, 2010). Apart from this group of highly skilled migrants, also the 
admission and procedures for seasonal workers, paid trainees and intra-corporate 
transferees is becoming more and more regulated (see Koehler cs. 2010 for an overview 
of recent measures).  
 In this paper we investigate, using both a theoretical model and empirical 
analysis, under which conditions immigration does help to compensate a lack of labour 
supply that results from an ageing population. It is obvious that immigration alone cannot 
account for keeping our GDP at a high level, and we also need other measures like a 
rising rate of labour force participation, particularly in the older age classes (Münz, 
2009). Therefore we also include the ratio of the working age population to the total 
population in both our theoretical and empirical analysis. With respect to the empirical 
analysis we simply take the case of the Netherlands to illustrate our theoretical reasoning 
of how immigration can alleviate the ageing problem. In that context it is interesting to 
note that in the Netherlands there are many concerns among citizens, politicians and the 
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis – an official independent research 
institute informing the Dutch government – on more liberal immigration policies (see e.g. 
Muysken et al. 2007). 
 Although the blue card seems to be a good instrument to attract more higher 
educated individuals, we show that it may be beneficial for the European Union to attract 
also immigrants who are not graduated from universities as long as the skill distribution 
of the immigrants is on average not less favourable than that of the EU countries. It is, 
however, very important that immigrants are in paid employment, so that the goods and 
services they produce can be consumed by the growing share of the population that has 
retired. We show that the benefits from immigration could proliferate further if policy 
makers focus successfully on an increase of the ratio of the working to the inactive 
population in general, which requires a better integration policy than in the past. The aim 
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of our theoretical and empirical analysis is to illustrate the relevance of this ratio, in 
particular in relation to immigration. 
 
Most of the literature on the impact of immigration on ageing focuses on the impact of 
immigration on the labour market and the welfare state with an emphasis on the short run 
– see Nannestad (2007) for an overview. A drawback of this focus then is that the impact 
of ageing and immigration on capital formation and economic growth usually are 
ignored. Razin and Sadka (1999, 2000) were the first who analysed the impact of 
immigration on ageing in a general equilibrium long-run context, taking this impact into 
account. They use a closed economy model, however. 
A difficulty with general equilibrium analysis in the long run is that it usually models 
the labour market in a highly stylised way, assuming full employment. But for the typical 
European welfare state the interaction between immigration, unemployment and ageing 
problems cannot be ignored. The ideal solution would be to develop a general 
equilibrium model which includes both the impact of ageing and immigration on 
economic growth, and models the interaction with unemployment in a satisfactory way. 
The problem is that such a model leads to a full-blown macroeconomic model, which can 
only be solved by means of simulation. Its underlying properties then remain hard to 
analyse.  
We therefore prefer a different route. First, we develop a model of the labour market 
which enables us to analyse the interaction between immigration, unemployment and 
ageing problems. This is a short-run model which ignores the impact of capital formation 
on economic growth. However, contrary to most models of the labour market, we include 
capital as a production factor. Capital is modeled to be substitutable with high-skilled 
labour in a nested CES-production structure, where the other component is low-skilled 
labour. This also allows for more flexibility in the substitution between high and low 
skilled labour compared to the Cobb-Douglas production function which is usually 
assumed in this type of analysis (Kemnitz, 2003; Krieger, 2004; Boeri and Brücker, 2005; 
Brücker and Jahn, 2011). Moreover, instead of the usual simple monopoly union model, 
we assume right-to-manage wage bargaining. 
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We then use a concise long-run macroeconomic model as a background for our 
analysis of the impact of immigration on ageing and capital formation in Western 
economies. The properties of that model are in line with the model of Razin and Sadka – 
although we have extended the model to an open economy. Moreover, our model is 
flexible enough to allow for the inclusion of unemployment. Finally, an attractive feature 
of our macroeconomic model is that it pays explicit attention to the importance of social 
equilibrium. Since we use capital as a production factor, we can also use the insights of 
the concise macroeconomic model to discuss the interaction between economic growth, 
the labour market and the welfare state. This enables us to analyse the mechanisms which 
can be used to explain the results when using a full-blown macroeconomic model. 
Finally, several interesting insights result from our analysis, which lead beyond the 
insights of using a Razin and Sadka type general equilibrium model or a labour market 
model separately. For instance we analyse simultaneously the impact of immigration on 
economic growth, while taking into account the interaction with both unemployment and 
ageing. 
 
The set up of our paper is as follows. We present some stylised facts for the Netherlands 
in section 2, which also introduces the data we use in our empirical analysis. We then 
develop a short-run model of the labour market in section 3 and incorporate that in a 
long-run macroeconomic model in section 4. Using the macroeconomic model we 
analyse the impact of immigration on welfare state and ageing problems. We argue that 
an important element is the extent to which immigration has a positive effect on the 
activity rate. For that reason we investigate in section 5 to which extent such an effect 
could be found for the Netherlands, together with other predicted effects from our 
analysis. We find that the empirical implications of our model can be corroborated for the 
Netherlands. Since we find a positive effect of immigration on the activity rate only for 
the first ten years after immigration, we conclude that for the Netherlands immigration 
can be used to alleviate the ageing problem if the integration and participation of 
immigrants in the labour market is improved. We elaborate and generalise this notion in 
our concluding remarks in section 6. 
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2.   Stylised facts for the Netherlands, 1970 – 20092 
 
Population growth has been very low in the Netherlands, hence GDP growth per capita is 
close to GDP growth as can be seen from Figure 1. As a consequence of ageing, the share 
of population 65+ increased from less than 9 % of total population in 1960 to over 15 % 
in 2009. 
 
Figure 1 GDP and GDP/capita 
 
 
The contribution of immigration to population growth follows from Figure 2.  
Immigration fluctuates around 0.7% of population, whereas emigration is increasing 
somewhat, but net immigration is usually positive around 0.15% of population. A final 
observation, highlighted in de Cörvers cs. (2009) is that the rate of immigration follows 
GDP growth remarkably close with a lag of two years – see also Figure 5 below.  
 
With respect to the characteristics of migrants, the educational composition of the non-
native population is summarised in Table 1. This shows that the immigrant population on 
average reflects quite well the native population in terms of education – not surprising the  
 “non-western” part of the non-native population has a higher incidence of low education. 
Kim, Levine and Lotti (2010) show that this also holds for the EU15. 
                                                 
2 The data sources are presented in Appendix I. 
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Figure 2 Immigration and emigration 
 
 
Table 1 Educational composition of labour force, 2001 -2009 (average shares) 
 Share in labour force 
Native Non-Native 
Level of 
education 
Low 0,25 0,30 
Medium 0,45 0,41 
High 0,30 0,28 
 
 
With respect to macroeconomic characteristics, three features deserve special attention: 
 
First the Dutch economy is characterised by persistent excess savings, consistent 
with a persistent surplus on the current account. Hence the net foreign asset position of 
the Netherlands is increasing.3 This phenomenon of excess savings is illustrated in Figure 
3, which also shows that the savings ratio relative to national income is relatively 
constant over time: It fluctuates around 25 per cent. The investment ratio shows a slight 
tendency to decline, after a marked drop in the early 1970s. 
                                                 
3 This is mitigated by negative valuation effects, since the Dutch performance in investing abroad is 
relatively poor (Holinski, Kool and Muysken, 2009a). 
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Figure 3 Savings and Investment 
 
 
The second feature which deserves special attention is the stability of the share of labour 
income in GDP. One sees from Figure 4 that after the turbulence in the early 1970s it 
remained almost constant around 60 per cent, although a slight decrease over time can be 
discerned.  
 
Figure 4 Share of labour income 
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The third feature which deserves attention is the observation that the strong increase in 
unemployment which occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s, and it secular decrease 
thereafter, is not reflected in the development of immigration, as can be seen from Figure 
5. Both unemployment and immigration show clear cyclical fluctuations, as one might 
expect in opposite directions. However, the secular developments show no clear 
relationship. 
 
Figure 5 Unemployment and immigration 
 
 
The above observations corroborate the following stylised facts in our analysis: 
(1) a consistently ageing population 
(2) positive net immigration, with an education similar to that of the native 
population, but 5% more low skilled 
(3) a constant propensity to consume 
(4) a constant ratio of labour income to GDP 
(5) no obvious relationship between unemployment and immigration 
These stylised facts will also appear in the model we develop below. 
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3. The short-run model of the labour market 
 
Kemnitz (2003) analyses the impact of immigration on an ageing economy, while 
allowing for unemployment. However, a disadvantage of Kemnitz’ analysis is that he 
ignores economic growth in order to keep the analysis manageable. The same holds for 
Boeri and Brücker (2005) in their elaborate analysis of the impact of immigration on the 
labour market and the welfare state.4 Both studies therefore implicitly sacrifice the 
general equilibrium long-run context, to allow for a much richer analysis of the impact of 
immigration on the welfare state. We will include the growth aspects in the analysis in 
the next section, following the analysis of Razin and Sadka (2000), but initially focus on 
the labour market in this section. 
We generalise Kemnitz’ analysis in several respects, for instance by distinguishing 
physical capital as a separate production factor and by allowing for more flexibility in the 
substitution between high and low skilled labour, when compared to the Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Moreover, instead of a monopoly union model, we assume right-to-
manage wage bargaining. Hence Kemnitz’ findings are a special case of our analysis. 
  
3.1. The production structure and wage formation 
 
To allow for a reasonale flexibility, while still analytically manageable, we use a two-
level CES-production function.5 That is, output Y is produced according to a nested CES-
production function allowing for the widely observed capital-skill complementarity:  
ܻ ൌ ൤ሺߣܮሻିఘ ൅ ൣሺ߲ܪሻିథ ൅  ሺߡܭሻିథ൧
ഐ
ഝ ൨
ିభഐ
  ߪ ൌ ଵଵାఘ ൒ 0    (1) 
 
H and L represent employment of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively, and 
K is capital. The parameters λ, ∂ and ι are productivity parameters. Low-skilled labour 
has a constant elasticity of substitution σ with capital and high-skilled labour. The latter 
form a complex F with a constant elasticity of substitution, ς:  
                                                 
4 Moreover Boeri and Brücker do not analyse the impact of ageing. 
5 Papageorgiou and Saam (2008: 120) note: “More recently, there is a revived interest in [this function] … 
Its flexibility, coming from the substitution parameters and an additional input, makes it an attractive 
choice for many applications in economic theory and empirics.” 
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ܨሺܪ, ܭሻ ൌ ൣሺ߲ܪሻିథ ൅  ሺߡܭሻିథ൧ି
భ
ഝ   ߫ ൌ ଵଵାథ ൒ 0    (2) 
 
When ς = 0, capital and high-skilled labour are complements, as is sometimes assumed in 
the literature.6  
This formulation of the production structure is much more general than Razin and 
Sadka (2000), who assume perfect substitutability between low and high-skilled labour, 
and Kemnitz (2003), who assumes the elasticity of subtitution to be unity (σ = 1) since he 
uses a Cobb-Douglas production function.7 Many studies find capital-skill 
complementarity, which is associated with ς < 1, and substitutability between high and 
low skilled labour, with σ > 1. See, for instance, Ben-Gad (2008), Papageorgiou and 
Saam (2008), Polgreen and Silos (2008) and Razak and Timmins (2008). We will use 
these restrictions in our analysis. 
Profit maximisation by the firm implies that marginal productivities should equal 
factor prices. Hence, when the low-skilled wage is wL, the high-skilled wage is wH and 
the interest rate is r, we find: 
 
1
11
.L
Y Yw
L L
                 (3a) 
1 111
. .H
Y Y Fw
H F H
                      (3b) 
ݎ ൅ ߜ ൑ డ௒డ௄ ൌ ቂ
௒
ிቃ
భ
഑ . ιଵି
భ
അ . ቂி௄ቃ
భ
അ        (3c) 
 
The workforce consists of NH and NL high-skilled and low-skilled persons, respectively. 
The high-skilled labour market is competitive, which implies that the wage rate wH is 
determined by full employment for all high-skilled persons.8 The marginal productivity 
                                                 
6 Kemnitz (2003) uses this assumption to ignore capital in his analysis. 
7 The Cobb-Douglas production function is also used in Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Krieger 
(2004) – and in more encompassing, applied models like Boeri and Brücker (2005). 
8 This is also assumed in Kemnitz (2003). It is relatively easy to extend the model for separate wage 
bargaining of high-skilled workers, see Boeri and Brücker (2005) for an ad hoc application in a similar 
model of the labour market. 
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condition for capital holds with inequality in case of a capital constraint for K<K* (see 
below). 
For low-skilled workers the wage is determined by union bargaining, where the 
union takes both the employment of high-skilled workers, which follows from labour 
supply, and the capital stock as given; the latter is the short-run feature of the model. We 
assume a right-to-manage model, where the bargaining power by unions equals ε – this 
encompasses Kemnitz’ (2003)  monopoly union model by setting ε = 1, and Razin and 
Sadka’s (2000) full competition when ε = 0. Denoting the level of unemployment 
benefits by b and assuming a tax rate tu, the expected income of a low-skilled worker is (1 
– u).tu.wL + u.b, where u is the low-skilled unemployment rate, u = (NL – L)/NL. The firm 
negotiates about the wage given its capital stock and employment of high skilled workers. 
The resulting wage then is found by maximising:9 
 
   1. (1 ) ( ). . .L u L LL w t N L b Y w L        0 < ε ≤ 1   (4) 
 
with respect to wL, subject to equation (3a), and given K and H. This yields:10 
 
. / ( ) (1 ). /(1 ) .
1 .( 1) / ( ) 1
L
L
L u
w u u bw
w t
   
  
        with  
1
( ) LL
ww

 
       (5) 
 
where ψ(wL) is the low-skilled labour share in income as a function of the low-skilled 
wage, and ψ’(wL)< 0 when σ > 1. 11  
Equation (5) cannot be solved explicitly for wL, due to the non-linear nature of 
ψ(wL).  For that reason we use a linear approximation of the first part of the right hand 
side, such that: 
 
. / ' (1 ). /(1 ) . . .( 1).
1 .( 1) / ' 1L Lu
u u bw w
t
        
              (6) 
                                                 
9 See also Jackman et al. (1989), as discussed in Carlin and Soskice (1990), pp. 393 ff. 
10 This is consistent with Kemnitz’ (2003) result when we assume a monopoly union and a Cobb-Douglas 
function, i.e. ε = 1 and σ = 1. 
11 We assume ψ(wL)>- ε.( σ-1) which always does hold for σ ≥ 1. 
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does hold, where ν > 0 is a constant and 
11
'    . This reproduces the important 
properties of the right hand side of (5) following from ψ’(wL)< 0 when σ > 1, ψ(wL) 
approximates 1 when σ decreases towards 1 and ψ(wL) increases when λ increases. The 
wage rate then is given by:12 
 
. (1 ). '. /(1 ) .
[1 . .( 1)].[ ' .( 1)] 1L u
u u bw
t
   
     
              (7) 
 
Thus the negotiated low-skilled wage is a mark-up on the benefit level, which decreases 
with an increase in unemployment u as seems plausible. Both a fall in the tax rate, tu, and 
a rise in low-skilled labour augmenting productivity, λ, will decrease the mark-up. It is 
also interesting to note that a decrease in the elasticity of substitution leads to a higher 
mark-up, since in that case it is more difficult for low-skilled labour to take over the role 
of high-skilled labour. 
 
3.2. Social equilibrium in the presence of unemployment 
  
Social equilibrium requires that the employed pay taxes at a rate tu to finance their 
unemployed colleagues. We assume a pay-as-you-go system where government sets the 
tax and benefit rates such that unemployment benefits are covered by tax revenues. Since 
we focus on low-skilled unemployment, we assume that the benefits are paid by taxes on 
the low-skilled wage only.13 That is, given a certain level of benefits b, consistency with a 
tax rate tu requires: 
 
tu.wL.L = b.(NL – L)         (8) 
 
                                                 
12 Again, this is consistent with Kemnitz’s (2003) result when we assume a monopoly union and a Cobb-
Douglas function, i.e. ε = 1 and σ = 1. Since he assumes a monopoly union, Kemnitz finds no impact of 
unemployment on the mark-up. 
13 This assumption, which is in line with Kemnitz (2003), is motivated by analytical tractability. Including 
benefits paid by high skilled workers complicates the analysis considerably, without altering the qualitative 
results. 
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One should realise that either the tax rate tu or the benefit level b is endogenous. 
Kemnitz (2003) assumes the tax rate tu to be determined a priori by government. 
However, in line with the approach more commonly used in the literature – e.g. for 
instance Boeri and Brücker (2005) – we assume that government sets a replacement rate 
β with respect to the net wage, and then derives the tax rate from substituting b = β.(1– 
tu).wL in equation (8).14,15  
When setting the replacement rate at β, we find from equation (7) that the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment u* is given by:16  
 
 1 . . [1 . .( 1)].[ ' .( 1)]* 1
1 (1 ). '.
u with           
            (9) 
 
We find the familiar result that equilibrium unemployment is higher the larger the 
replacement rate – see for instance Boeri and Brücker (2005).17 Similarly, a higher union 
power ε also leads to a higher rate of unemployment, while an increase in low-skilled 
labour augmenting technological productivity, i.e. a higher value of λ, would lead to a 
lower rate of unemployment. Finally, an important observation is that from the analysis 
above it follows that the equilibrium unemployment rate of low-skilled workers, u*, is 
not affected by the supply of low skilled workers. The latter is consistent with stylised 
fact (5) from section 2, which shows that there is no secular relationship between 
unemployment and immigrants. Here one should also take into account stylised fact (2) 
that immigration is roughly speaking skill neutral. 
 
3.3. Short-run equilibrium 
  
Using equation (9), the aggregate rate of unemployment, utot, is given by: 
                                                 
14 This approach would not work in the analysis of Kemnitz (2003), since he finds no impact of 
unemployment on the mark-up due to his assumption of a monopoly union. 
15 We assume that unions respect the choice of government of a fixed replacement rate, i.e. they do not  
exploit it and therefore it is not included as an additional constraint on the maximisation problem of 
equation (4). 
16 A similar equation is used by Boeri and Brücker (2005), although they introduce this equation ad hoc.  
17 A necessary condition for positive unemployment is [1 . .(1 )].[ ' .(1 )] / .             . 
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(1 *).1 *L H Ltot
L H L H
u N N Nu u
N N N N
           (10) 
 
One sees that when the number of available low-skilled workers increases relative to the 
number of high-skilled ones, the aggregate rate of unemployment increases. However, 
when both numbers increase proportionally, the aggregate rate of unemployment is 
unaffected. 
The share of total labour income in national income, α, is implicitly given by: 
1 1 11 11
1 1 11
[ .(1 *). ] [ . ] . ( ; )
1
[ . ] . ( ; )
L H H
H
u N N F K N
K F K N
  
  

 
 
 
        (11) 
 
which is a function of the capital stock. Since we assume σ > 1 and ς < 1, we find that α 
increases with NL and decreases with NH, given K. However, α does not change when NL, 
NH and given K change with an equal proportion. We will use this relationship in our 
further analysis. It seems also consistent with stylised fact (4) from section 2, which 
shows that the ration of labour income to GDP is constant over time. 
 A final observation is that since L = (1 – u*).NL, we know from equation (3a) that 
the low skilled wage decreases when the supply of low-skilled workers increases. This is 
an important observation since a popular perception is that most immigrant workers are 
unskilled and therefore immigration leads to a lower wage for unskilled workers. 
However, apart from the bias in this perception – see stylised fact (2), this observation 
does only hold unambiguously in the short run, when the capital stock is given. In the 
next section we analyse the interaction of changes in labour supply with the capital stock. 
 
4. The long-run model of the economy 
 
In the previous section, we presented a model of the labour market, which can serve as a 
basis for an analysis of the impact of immigration on an ageing economy. However, this 
was a short-run model in which we assume the capital stock to be given. In this section 
we develop a concise macroeconomic model, to include the impact of capital 
accumulation in our analysis and also the influence of the ageing process. The resulting 
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model enables us to discuss the interaction between economic growth, the labour market 
and the welfare state. This leads our analysis both beyond that of Razin and Saka, and 
beyond that of Kemnitz and Boeri and Brücker. 
 
4.1. Capital accumulation 
  
We assume that the firm follows equation (3c) when determining its desired capital stock; 
it also looks at the world interest rate which is set at an exogenous level, r*. Then the 
equilibrium capital stock, K*, can be solved using substitution of equation (1) in 1 – α = 
r*.K/Y, which yields: 
 
1 െ ߙ ൌ ሺ௥כାఋሻ௄
ቈሺఒሺଵି௨כሻேಽሻషഐାൣሺడேಹሻషഝା ሺఐ௄ሻషഝ൧
ഐ
ഝ ቉
షభഐ
        (12) 
 
Combining equations (11) and (12) then solves the equilibrium capital stock K* as a 
linear homogenous function f of NL and NH :  
 
K* = f(λ.NL, ∂.NH; r*+ δ ,u*)  f’1, f’2 > 0     (13) 
 
The equilibrium capital stock K* increases when NL or NH increase, and it increases 
proportionally with NL and NH, when these grow at the same rate. A lower interest rate or 
a lower rate of low-skilled unemployment will lead to a higher equilibrium capital stock.  
 To model economic growth we assume skill-neutral labour augmenting 
technological progress at a rate a, i.e. both λ and ∂ grow at that rate. Moreover, the labour 
force grows in a skill neutral way at a rate n, i.e. both NL and NH grow at that rate. Then 
from equations (13) and (3c) it follows that both output and equilibrium capital will grow 
at a rate a + n, when there are no constraints on investment. However, when investment I 
is constrained for reasons we discuss below, the capital stock equals K’ < K* and a 
different rate of growth results, as we elaborate below. One should realise that in that 
case firms also make profits, which we assume to be retained earnings. These are 
included in the asset accumulation as we discuss below. 
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 In general the capital stock is given by:  
 
K = min (K’, K*)          (14) 
 
Taking into account that capital depreciates at a rate δ, gross investment I follows from: 
 
I = K – (1 – δ).K-1            (15) 
 
4.2. Asset accumulation 
 
In our concise macroeconomic model we distinguish between two generations. The 
younger generation (‘young’ for short) consists of Ny persons, of which E are working, 
saving and paying pension contributions. Aggregate employment equals E = (1 – u*).NL 
+ NH and the average real wage rate is w. The remaining part of the younger generation is 
either unemployed or not in the labour force. The older generation (‘old’ for short) lives 
from pension benefits and dissavings; it consists of No persons.  
The young contribute a share tp of their income to pension benefits of the old in a 
pay-as-you-go system.  The young both earn wages and have income from capital – we 
assume the young to own a share φ of total assets A in the economy. Disposable income 
of the young, Yy, then equals:18 
 
Yy = (1 – tp).[w.E + r.φ.A]  (16) 
 
The young consume a share c of their disposable income.19 
Disposable income of the old, Yo, consists of their income from capital and the 
pension benefits financed by the young: 
 
Yo = r.( 1 – φ).A + tp.[w.E + r.φ.A]       (17) 
                                                 
18 Premiums for unemployment are already included, since w = [(1 – tu).wL.(1 – u*).NL + wH.NH]/E. For 
simplicity we ignore the impact of unemployment benefits in disposable income, since this complicates the 
analysis considerably without adding new insights.  
19 The constant propensity to consume of the young and full consumption of the old is consistent with 
intertemporal optimising behaviour; see for instance Razin and Saka (2001) – see also stylised fact (3) from 
section 2. 
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The old do not only consume their disposable income, but also their capital stock at a rate 
ξ ; hence their dissavings equal ξ.(1 – φ).A.  
Domestic savings then equal savings of the young minus dissavings of the old: 
 
S = (1 – c).Yy – ξ.( 1 – φ).A        (18) 
 
Asset accumulation then follows from: 
 
A = A-1 + S + π         (19) 
 
where π represents the profits of firms, which are retained earnings by firms. These 
profits are given by: 
 
π = r*(K* – K)         (20) 
 
In a closed economy model national income, Yy + Yo, equals GDP, Y, and hence assets are 
equal to the (desired) capital stock – there are no retained earnings. Comparison between 
equations (15) and (19) then shows that should hold: K = K-1 + S = I + (1 – δ).K-1, and 
therefore equality between net-savings and investment: S = I – δK-1. Asset accumulation 
then follows capital accumulation, but the interest rate then is endogenous and no longer 
given by the world market. This is for instance the case in Razin and Sadka (2001).  
 The situation is different in an open economy context, where national income 
differs from GDP by net foreign income from abroad. Our stylised facts show that this 
has been positive for ages in the Netherlands – see Figure 3 above. One option is to allow 
foreign assets to accumulate independently of capital accumulation in our model 
according to equation (19), without bothering about possible feed-back effects. In that 
case capital accumulates at a rate of growth a + n as we discussed after equation (13).  
 We prefer a more general approach which encompasses both extremes. Due to the 
presence of a home bias and habit formation, we assume that a certain proportion µ of the 
assets in a country will be invested in the domestic capital stock with no impact of a 
small open economy like the Netherlands on the world market interest rate r* – see also 
Holinski, Kool and Muysken (2009b) and Mondria and Wu (2010). Moreover, due to 
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home bias and habit formation in the rest of the world, the gap between the desired 
capital stock and domestic available assets can be filled by only a fraction λ. This implies 
for the constrained capital stock 
 
K = (1 – λ).µA + λ.K*         (21) 
 
One sees that when both λ = 0 and µ = 1 , A = K and we are in the closed economy 
situation and savings equal investment – the endogenous interest rate then also guarantees 
K = K*. When both λ = 1 and µ = 0, there is no home bias and there are no constraints on 
investment. In that case the equilibrium capital stock will always be obtained at the world 
market interest rate, compare equation (13).  
 
From equations (16), (18) and (19) we can derive: 
 
rK* - r(1 - T. A*)K  =  [1 - T.φ.r. + ξ.( 1 – φ)].A - A-1    (22) 
 
with α* = α /(1 – α), T = (1 – c)(1 – tp) and use of α*K =wEα /(1 – α). Combining this 
with equation (21), in the constrained case, and the observation that K* grows at a rate a 
+ n, i.e. 
 
K* = (1 + a + n). K*-1        (23) 
 
yields a dynamic system of three equations in K, K* and A. The dynamics of the system 
(21) – (23) is analysed in Appendix 2. The result is a difference equation in b=A/K* 
 
ܾ ൌ ଵሺ௔ା௡ାଵሻሺௗିఓሺଵିఒሻሺ௙ି௥ሻሻ ܾିଵ ൅
௥ାሺ௙ି௥ሻఒ
ௗିఓሺଵିఒሻሺ௙ି௥ሻ      (24) 
 
with d ≡ 1 – [Tφr - ξ(1-φ)] and f = Tα*r. The interpretation of f is savings of wage 
income after taxes and pension premiums per unit of capital. 
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Concentrating on stable cases that lead to a positive steady-state value,20 we assume a 
positive intercept and a slope lower than unity. A higher intercept and a lower slope will 
lead to higher transitional growth rates. We are in particular interested in the impact of 
the rate of contribution tp on the growth rate. Higher pension premiums tp lead to lower 
values of f and higher values of d. Higher values of d lead to a lower value of the slope 
and of the intercept and therefore to lower growth rates. Lower values of f go in the same 
direction. Higher premiums therefore reduce the private assets to efficient capital ratio, 
A/K*. According to equation (21) capital growth is above a + n to the extent that A/K* is 
growing. Therefore capital also has a growth rate that is falling with tp.  
 
Figure 6 Economic growth and the GC and SE-curves 
 
 
 
The relation between the rate of growth of capital g and the contribution rate tp is 
presented in Figure 6. We name this relationship the growth-contribution or GC-curve, 
since for each contribution rate tp we get a different capital growth rate, as long as capital 
accumulation is related to growth of domestic assets, λ < 1. The intuition behind the 
                                                 
20 Several other cases are discussed in Appendix 2.   
tp
g 
 a+n 
 t* 
SE 
0 
GC 
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downward sloping nature of the curve in case of λ < 1 is that a higher contribution rate 
leads to a lower rate of growth, since less funds are available for investment, because 
they go into the consumption of the old as in equation (17). The curve will shift upwards 
when the propensity to consume c decreases, since more income then will be saved at the 
same contribution rate. The same occurs when the old dissave less, that is when ξ 
decreases or φ increases. Finally, a higher share of labour income α and a higher interest 
rate r also lead to an upward shift of the GC-curve. When λ = 1, the GC-curve is the 
horizontal line at a growth rate a + n. 
 
4.3. Social equilibrium 
 
Next to unemployment compensation, see the discussion in section 2.2 and equation (8), 
social equilibrium also requires that consumption per capita of the old is at least equal to 
a constant fraction η of consumption per capita of the young. This is a matter of social 
responsibility, since the old have contributed in their young days to the development of 
the economy as it is now for the young. Moreover, political reality requires that the old 
have sufficient benefits, since they represent a growing part of the electorate in an ageing 
economy. Social equilibrium then requires: 
 
η.c.Yy/Ny = [Yo + ξ.( 1 – φ).A]/No       (25) 
 
where Ny and No represent the number of young and old, respectively. The term in 
brackets of equation (25) is consumption of the old.  
 Substituting equations (16) and (17) in equation (25) yields: 
 
ܭ ൌ  ቈ ଵఎ.௖.൫ଵ – ௧೛൯.ಿ೚ಿ೤  – ௧೛ 
. ௥ା క௥ .
ଵ – ఝ
ןכ െ
ఝ
ןכ቉ . ܣ ൌ ݔଵ. ܣ       (26) 
 
Combining this equation with equation (21) yields in the constrained case:21 
 
                                                 
21 Provided that holds: ݐ௣ ൐ ൤ߟ. ܿ. ே
೚
ே೤ െ
ଵ
 ஜା കןכ
. ௥ା క௥ .
ଵ – ఝ
ןכ ൨ / ቀ1 ൅  ߟ. ܿ.
ே೚
ே೤ ቁ 
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 ܭ ൌ ߣ  ௫భ௫భିሺଵ – ఒሻ.ஜ ܭ
כ          (27) 
  
Equation (27) shows that the rate of growth of capital consistent with social equilibrium 
is a + n, as long as the other parameters of the model remain constant. However, any 
change in the parameters constituting x1 will lead to a change in the ratio K/K* and hence 
will have at least intermediate growth effects. For instance, an increase in the rate of 
contribution tp will lead to an increase in the ratio K/K* and hence to at least a temporary 
increase in the growth rate of K. This is intuitively plausible since a higher rate of growth 
implies higher consumption growth of the young relative to the old when the contribution 
rate is low. This may compensate the effect that a higher premium increases consumption 
of the old relative to that of the young. For that reason the social equilibrium equation 
(27) is presented as the increasing SE-curve in Figure 6, which intersects with the steady 
state equilibrium with a growth rate a + n at the contribution rate tp*. 
The curve will shift downwards when the number of old increases relative to 
young since a higher ratio No/Ny will lead to a decline in the ratio K/K* and hence to a 
decline in the growth rate of K. In that case a higher contribution is needed at the same 
rate of growth to obtain social equilibrium. The same holds when the share η is higher, or 
the propensity to consume c has increased. Finally the curve shifts upwards in case of a 
lower share of labour income in GDP α and a lower return on investment r. 
 
 
4.4. Economic growth in an ageing economy and the impact of immigration 
 
To model economic growth we have assumed skill-neutral labour augmenting 
technological progress at a rate a. Moreover, the labour force grows in a skill neutral way 
at a rate n. In that case both output and equilibrium capital will grow at a rate a + n. In 
terms of Figure 6 this occurs on the intersection of the GC-curve and the SE-curve, at a 
rate of growth a + n. The rate of contributions then is tp*.  
 It follows from the analysis above that ageing of the economy induces a 
downward shift of the SE-curve, following an increase in the ratio of old to young, No/Ny. 
This leads in the intermediate phase to a higher rate of contributions and a lower rate of 
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growth. The intuition is that part of the savings of the economy cannot be used for capital 
formation but are necessary to provide consumption for the old. 
 
Next to the restriction on capital growth, there are also another mechanisms through 
which ageing of the economy will lead to lower growth, in particular lower growth per 
capita. To elaborate this, we decompose GDP per capita as follows: 
 
௒
௉ ൌ
௒
௄ .
௄
ா .
ா
ே .
ே
௉           (28) 
 
where E represents employment, N the labour force and P population. Since in our model 
both the interest rate and the share of labour income are fixed, the capital output ratio is 
fixed too and output growth equals the growth of capital. This explains why the first term 
of equation (28) is constant, and output growth follows from the model above, 
summarised in Figure 6.  
The second term of equation (28) converges in our model to productivity growth 
a. There is ample evidence of a negative impact of ageing on productivity: Although 
most macroeconomic studies are quite agnostic about the mechanisms, they find 
consistently an inverse U-shaped relation between the share of workers in different age 
groups and productivity – see Feyrer (2007), Gómez and Hernández de Cos (2008), 
Werding (2008) and Lindh and Malmberg (2009). Most studies point at microeconomic 
evidence which shows that experience increases with age in initial stages, but has 
decreasing returns later on.22 As a consequence of the negative impact of ageing on 
productivity growth, both the GC-curve and the SE-curve will shift downwards, leading 
to a further decrease in the rate of growth.  
The secular decrease in unemployment in the Netherlands, see Figure 5 above, 
has led to an increase in the ratio of employment to labour force (although this should be 
corrected for hours worked per person). However, as we also mentioned in section 2, the 
share of old persons in the population has increased strongly, leading to a decrease in the 
last term of equation (28).   
                                                 
22 For microeconomic evidence see Vandenberghe and Waltenberg (2010) and the literature reviewed 
therein. 
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 From that perspective it is not surprising that economic policy is focusing on 
reducing the ratio old relative to young – or more precisely, to increase the ratio of the 
working to the inactive population. One way to enhance this process is to increase the 
retirement age – in the model some ‘old’ then become ‘young’ and the SE-curve shifts 
upwards in Figure 6. In that case both the second term and the last term in equation (30) 
will increase. A similar effect is obtained by encouraging immigration, which usually 
consists of young persons. This would lead to both an upward shift in the SE-curve and 
increased economic growth through growth in labour supply.  
Next to that there is also another mechanism which is important in case of skill 
neutral migration.  Kim, Levine and Lotti (2010) argue that skill neutral migration 
enhances growth for two reasons. First since migration takes usually place from low 
productivity to high productivity countries, economic growth is enhanced. Second, 
immigrants usually start in jobs for which they are overqualified, this also enhances 
productivity growth. Some evidence for the latter is also provided by Huber cs. (2010).  
For all these reasons a higher rate of growth can be realised through immigration, 
without increasing the rate of contributions – provided that the immigrants are included 
in the workforce. In our view this is also intuitively understood by both the United 
Nations and the European Union in their advice to allow for more immigration (UN, 
2000; EU, 2005).  
 
 
5. Some empirical evidence regarding the impact of active relative to inactive 
persons  
 
In the previous section we argued that the ratio of active over inactive persons, the 
activity rate Ny/No in our model, has a positive impact on the growth rate and that 
therefore immigration has a positive effect too, if the percentage increase in active 
persons is larger than that of inactive persons. In this section we want to provide some 
empirical evidence for these statements using data for the Netherlands.  
The population consists of both migrants together with young and old natives. 
About half of them are part of the labour force (in terms of persons), and some of these 
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are unemployed. The crucial question then is, which impact immigration has on the ratio 
of hours worked per person in the population and which impact the latter has on the GDP 
per capita. For that reason we use the ratio of the total hours worked, L, over the total 
population, P, to capture the activity rate. The growth rate was defined as the change of 
the capital stock, given its past value. In addition we want to check whether indeed the 
past immigration has had a positive impact on this relation after the year of immigration, 
and for how many years.  
 The data for population, GDP per capita and gross fixed capital formation in 
constant 2000 Euros are taken from the World Development Indicators. Wage data are 
labour compensation per hour worked deflated by the GDP deflator from the KLEMS 
data base with adjustment of their base year from 1995 to 2000, and two observations 
added using growth rates from CPB. Employed persons in terms of 1000 full-time 
equivalents, hours worked per full-time equivalent and unemployment data come from 
the CPB using the international definition for the latter. Immigration data are from the 
CBS. Precise sources are provided in Appendix 1, and a general description of the data 
used has been given in section 2. 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we want to show that total 
hours worked per person in the population, which is lower under ageing and probably 
higher under immigration, has a positive impact on the GDP per capita. We estimate a 
vector-error correction model in the natural logarithm of (i) GDP per capita, logy, (ii) the 
ratio of gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, log(I/Y), (iii) the ratio of hours 
worked by thousand full-time equivalent workers per person in the population, log(L/P), 
(iv) real wages, logw, (v) the unemployment rate, u, and (vi) immigration per person in 
the population, im/P. Second, we regress the L/P ratio on immigration as a share of the 
population, im/P, for many lags in order to show that immigration increases the L/P ratio 
in early years after immigration, but not in the later years. 
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5.1 The vector-error correction model (VECM) 
 
A stable vector-autoregressive model (VAR) in the six variables indicated above and a 
time trend has an optimal lag-length of three according to the final prediction error 
criterion.23 The corresponding Johansen cointegration test with two lags indicates five 
cointegrating equations, which are long-term economic relations, at the 5% significance 
level for MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values according to both, the trace test and the 
maximum-eigenvalue test. These long-term relations are as follows (with t-values in 
parentheses): 
 
CE1 = logyt-1  - 0.8261log(L/P) t-1 - 0.016trend -9.6       (29) 
            (-21.36)           (-37.6)                 
  
CE2 = log(I/Y) t-1  + 0.45log(L/P) t-1 + 0.004trend – 2.98      (30) 
                                 (6.5)                   (4.12) 
                                  
CE3 = log(L/P) -251.9(IM/P)t-1 - 0.0026trend -2.22     (31) 
               (-31.4)                (-0.9)          
 
CE4 = logw t-1 +0.03u t-1  -0.0075trend -2.77      (32) 
  (13.54)     (-8.62) 
 
CE5 = (IM/P) t-1  -0.006logw t-1  + 0.0000485trend +0.0087    (33) 
      (-19.04)       (4.52)   
 
Equation (29) indicates that the direct effect of a percentage change in L/P translates into 
one of the GDP per capita with a factor of 0.83. However, the investment ratio decreases 
by a factor 0.45 according to equation (30). Immigration increases the hours per persons 
ratio according to equation (31), which in turn increases the level of growth in equation 
(29). Unemployment decreases the wage in equation (32). And wages enhance 
immigration in equation (33). The complete VECM consists of the following six 
equations (t-values in parentheses), where we do not show the first and second lags of 
                                                 
23 Other criteria allow for one to four lags. However, having two lags in the error-correction model should 
allow us to avoid serial correlation. Using more lags reduces the degrees of freedom even further. 
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first differences of all variables here (these are shown in Appendix 3; there position is 
indicated by ‘…’): 
 
 
 d(logy) = -0.62CE1 + 0.49CE2+0.32CE3+1.02 CE4 + 81.47CE5 + …+ 0.018    (34) 
     (-2.75)   (2.92)      (2.43)       (4.95)      (2.33)                    (1.6)      
      Adj. R2: 0.44 
 
d(log(I/Y)) = -1.29CE1 - 0.29CE2 + 0.55CE3 +1.46CE4+131.4CE5 + …-0.046   (35) 
                      (-3.3)        (-1.3)          (3.07)    (5.05)        (2.83)  (-3.25) 
                                                                                                                  Adj. R2: 0.78 
      
d(log(L/P)) = 0.16CE2 + 0.13CE3 + 0.37CE4 + 32.57CE5 + …-0.003      (36) 
                      (1.72)        (1.79)        (3.55)        (1.68)        (-0.53) Adj. R2: 0.7456 
 
d(U) = -11.88CE1 - 5.79CE2 -12.45CE3 -17.75CE4 - 2923CE5 + … +0.15   (37) 
             (-1.59)       (-1.55)       (-4.19)         (-3.52)  (-3.78)          (0.63)  
      Adj.R2: 0.84 
 
d(log(W)) = 0.93CE1-0.37CE2+0.32CE3-0.325CE4+80.6CE5+…+0.0356   (38) 
                   (2.97)       (-2.79)    (2.98)        (-1.68)     (2.9)             (3.83) Adj. R2: 0.7464 
 
d(IM/P) = 0.019CE1 – 0.0126CE4 - 1.35CE5 + …  -0.0008      (39) 
      (1.16)  (-1.54) (-3.93)             (-1.52)   Adj. R2: 0.575 
 
The period of estimation is 1973–2009. Restrictions in the long-term relations identify all 
cointegrating vectors. Adjustment coefficients with t-values below unity have been 
restricted to zero in order to keep the model simpler. For the imposed restrictions the LR 
test has a significance level of p(χ2)=0.85. 
Equation (34) is a growth equation, where the standard population growth term 
has been replaced by the log(L/P) term and the arguments are spread over all error-
correction terms. Equation (35) is an investment equation, where the growth rate of the 
investment ratio depends also on all error-correction terms. Equations (36) – (39) show 
feedback effects of the cointegrating equations on changes of L/P, unemployment,  wage 
rates and immigration . Only equations (36) and (39) have insignificant adjustment 
coefficients.  
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We illustrate that the working of the complete model is in line with equations (31) and 
(29) by applying a shock to the immigration variable and looking at the impulse response. 
The result can be seen in Figure 7.24  
 
 
A shock of one standard deviation of the migration variable, 0.00066, which is about 
10% of the average migration per person value, 0.0065. It has a persistent though small 
long term effect on its own value. The long-term impact on the L/P ratio is 0.004, a bit 
                                                 
24 Technically speaking this is a response to a non-facturised one standard deviation of an IM/P innovation 
on: log(y), log(I/Y), log(L/P), d(U), log(W), d(IM/P). 
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less than a half per cent. In line with (29) the impact on the GDP per capita is about 
0.0033 in the long run. Investment shares are slightly reduced indicating a sectoral shift 
to low-skill sectors in the past, when migration was allowed in order to prevent sector 
movements to low-wage countries. The shock to immigration can be seen as a removal of 
a constraint on labour demand. The increased labour demand reduces unemployment and 
enhances average wages, both at fairly small amounts though.    
 
 
5.2 The impact of immigration on the activity rate 
 
The VECM is based on a VAR that has three lags. The next question now is whether or 
not immigration has a positive impact on the L/P ratio when more lags are allowed for. 
As we want to employ many more lags than the VECM has, we run a separate regression 
for log(L/P) on all variables that have an impact on it according to equation (36) and in 
addition to eleven lags of immigration per person of the population, im/P. Stepwise 
forward and backward regressions then result in a significantly positive effect of 
immigration on the L/P ratio (not shown). However, lags seven and higher are mostly and 
increasingly negative. In order to get a bit more of a structured result we impose the 
assumption of a polynomial distributed lag of the third degree on the immigration 
variable.25 The results for the lags of the immigration/ population ratio are presented in 
Figure 8.26 From the ninth year after immigration onward, the impact of immigration on 
labour hours is negative. The positive total effect is insignificant in this case of a 
regression.27  
The result also holds if we add more lags and if we replace the polynomial of 
third degree by one of degree two or one, at the cost of getting more serial correlation 
though. As we estimate twelve parameters with 37 observations this result cannot be 
robust to all possible other changes though. Our interpretation of this result is that even if 
some members of an immigrant family work, there are relatively more dependents after 
                                                 
25 The third degree used has the advantage that it is sufficiently flexible, while one can avoid running into 
serial correlation.  
26 The details for the regression are presented in Appendix 3. 
27 In Muysken et al. (2008) we found a significantly positive coefficient in a similar regression for persons 
in the labour force, instead of hours worked. 
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ten years. Moreover, as we found a significantly positive coefficient of immigration in a 
similar regression for persons in the labour force instead of hours worked in Muysken et 
al. (2008), less hours worked per person after the movement of labour-intensive branches 
to low-wage countries might also be part of an explanation.  
 
Figure 8:  
The impact of the lagged immigration/population ratio and the labour/population ratio 
 
      Lag Distribution of IM/P                 lag i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
               .*             |  0  0.13784  2.17645  0.06333 
               .       *      |  1  0.89298  1.17106  0.76254 
               .          *   |  2  1.35326  0.70032  1.93233 
               .            * |  3  1.55648  0.64705  2.40550 
               .            * |  4  1.54046  0.68592  2.24581 
               .          *   |  5  1.34299  0.69856  1.92252 
               .       *      |  6  1.00189  0.71325  1.40468 
               .    *         |  7  0.55496  0.75083  0.73912 
               *              |  8  0.04001  0.77827  0.05141 
           *   .              |  9 -0.50514  0.75307 -0.67078 
      *        .              |  10 -1.04270  0.74080 -1.40754 
  *            .              |  11 -1.53485  1.06694 -1.43855 
 Sum of Lags   5.33817  6.44655  0.82807 
 
Ageing requires a higher number of active persons. Our evidence shows that it is 
possible to increase the labour population ratio via immigration for some years. However, 
in later years the positive impact vanishes. For immigration to be a tool to help mitigating 
the ageing problem this relation requires policy improvements. If policy can arrange 
immigration in a way that hours worked relative to the population increase, our VECM 
above shows that GDP per capita can increase by about 80% of the percentage change in 
the hours worked per person in the population. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
In this paper we have extended the work of Razin and Sadka (2000), Kemnitz (2003), 
Krieger (2004) and Boeri and Brücker (2005) by analysing immigration in a general 
equilibrium context, including physical capital in a CES production function, using a 
right-to-manage wage bargaining model, and allowing for unemployment. The main 
conclusion from the theoretical model is that income per capita will increase due to 
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immigration, under the condition that the immigrants find employment and contribute to 
the skill distribution at least proportionally to the native population. The increase in 
capital accumulation following immigration, turns out to be an additional determinant of 
economic growth when analysing the benefits of immigration. 
 Our empirical analysis for the Netherlands reveals that at least hours worked 
relative to the population must increase in order to get a positive impact of immigration 
on the economy. Thus to stimulate economic growth it is of utmost importance that 
immigration policy as a means to mitigate the aging problem should not only focus on the 
number of immigrants, but also on their employability by keeping the skill structure in 
line with the skill distribution of domestic labour market entrants. This requires two 
steps: (1) skill neutral screening of immigrants and (2) an education policy that has the 
ambition and ability to educate the second and third generations of immigrants, at least in 
line with the average skill distribution in a country. 
 Our conclusions support the view of the European Commission that immigrants in 
general have a positive impact on the economy provided that they are employed. As the 
European Commission puts it: “the current situation and prospects of EU labour markets 
can be broadly described as a ‘need’ scenario. Some Member States already experience 
substantial labour and skills shortages in certain sectors of the economy, which cannot be 
filled within the national labour markets. This phenomenon concerns the full range of 
qualifications – from unskilled workers to top academic professionals.” (EU, 2005, p. 
4).28 In line with this statement by the European Commission we argue, following our 
theoretical and empirical results, that the immigration policy of the European Union with 
respect to the blue card and the admission of some other specific groups is too restrictive 
to maximise the benefits from immigration in the light of an ageing population. 
 Finally, the expectations from immigration as a single cure for falling birth rates 
and an ageing population should not be too high, since it is only one policy instrument 
within a broader mix and it has only small effects as shown in our empirical analysis. 
Many countries in the European Union should worry about their high unemployment and 
low employment rates, and give more priority to increase employment. However, our 
                                                 
28 More recent EU policy views are less optimistic on the positive impact of migration as is surveyed in 
Koehler cs. (2010).  However, in line with Koehler et al., we think that position is too pessimistic and 
reflects a defensive reaction in response to the recent crisis. 
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analysis shows a slightly positive effect of immigration on employment. Immigration 
policies should go hand in hand with active labour market policies and education policies 
to get the low-skilled unemployed back to work and to prevent young people, both 
natives and immigrants, from early school leaving, thereby raising their level of 
education and opportunities on the labour market. 
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Appendix 1 The data used 
 
 
Variable Source Definition 
   
w KLEMS; Real wage (Labour compensation per hour worked deflated by GDP  
deflator 2000). This series is only available till 2007. 
P WDI Population (mid-year) 
y WDI GDP pc 
I/Y WDI Gfcf/GDP 
L WDI Labour force. total  
u CPB Unemployment rate; international definition 
EMPFTE CPB Employment in full-time equivalents 
hours CPB Working hours of a full-time employee (in hours/year)  
im CBS Immigration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CBS:   Statline, http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/dome/default.aspx  
 
CPB:  CEP, 2011, http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/central-economic-plan-2011 
 
KLEMS: EU KLEMS Productivity Report: http://www.euklems.net 
 
WDI:  World Development Indicators, Worldbank 
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Appendix 2  Asset and capital stock dynamics under home asset preference and 
perfect capital markets 
 
The basic equations are (21) -  (23). They can be rewritten as  
K= (1 - λ)μA + λK*         (21) 
 
A = A-1/d + (rK* - rK + fK)/d  with d ≡ 1 – [Tφr - ξ(1-φ)] and f=Tα*r  (22) 
 
K*= (1+a+n)K*-1         (23) 
 
This is a system of three difference equations in A, K, and K*. In order to transform it 
into one equation in b ≡ A/K*, we define k ≡ K/K*. Dividing both sides of (22) by K* 
and multiplying and dividing the first term by K*-1 and using (23) yields 
  
ܾ ൌ ܾିଵ ଵ௔ା௡ାଵ
ଵ
ௗ ൅
௥ି௥௞ା௙௞
ௗ         (22’) 
 
Dividing both sides of (21) by K* yields 
 
k= (1 - λ)μb + λ         (21’) 
 
Insertion of (21’) into (22’) yields a difference equation in b: 
 
ܾ ൌ ܾିଵ 1ܽ ൅ ݊ ൅ 1
1
݀ ൅
ݎ ൅ ሺ݂ െ ݎሻሺݎሺ1 െ  ߣሻߤܾ ൅  ߣሻ
݀  
 
Putting b-terms to the left-hand side leaving its lag on the right-hand side yields 
 
ܾ ൌ ܾିଵ 1ሺܽ ൅ ݊ ൅ 1ሻሺ݀ െ ߤሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ݂ െ ݎሻሻ ൅
ݎ ൅ ሺ݂ െ ݎሻߣ
݀ െ ߤሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ݂ െ ݎሻ 
 
This equation can be drawn with b on the vertical axis and b-1 on the horizontal axis. 
Realistic cases have a positive and constant long-run value of b=A/K* > 0. This requires 
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a negative or positive slope that is below unity and a positive intercept. We discuss three 
special cases, two of which fulfill this requirement: 
  
(i) The special case λ=1 of efficient capital K=K*, has an intercept f/d>0 and a 
slope 1/[(a+n+1)d], with d >1 as the expression Tφr in (22) is a product of 
four percentage expressions all smaller than unity. Other cases can be 
constructed but they also hold without λ=1 and are discussed below. 
(ii) A second special case is f=r. The interpretation of f is savings of wage income 
after taxes and pension premiums per unit of capital. The slope is as in the 
previous case and the intercept is r/d, which are both positive in non-
inflationary times of positive real interest rates.  
(iii) Amano’s (1965) case of negative and increasing net-foreign debt D:  
D/K≡ (K-A)/K=1 – A/K <0 requires a permanently positive growth of 
A/K=(A/K*)/(K/K*) =b/k. Equation (21’) implies that k/b = (1 - λ)μ + λ/b 
should fall permanently, but it has a limit of (1 - λ)μ .When μ = 0 and b going 
to infinity we find the minimum value of k/b = 0, then b/k is infinity. This 
requires a positive intercept and a slope larger than unity. 
(iv) A constant ratio D/K ≡ (K-A)/K ≡1-A/K > (<) 0, requires a constant 
A/K=(A/K*)/(K/K*)=b/k. According to (21’) this also requires a constant b.      
For our case of aging and immigration only cases of constant b are relevant. If b goes to a 
constant value it follows from (21’) that k=K/K* goes to a constant value. By implication 
b/k=A/K also go to a constant value. If b is constant, then A and K* grow at the same rate 
and K must have the same rate as well, which is a + n. 
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Appendix 3  Estimation results for section 5 
 
First and second lags of first-differenced variables of the vector-error-correction model 
(standard error in parantheses, t-values in brackets)  
 
  
Lagged variable
(34): 
d(logy)
(35): 
d(log(I/Y))
(36): 
d(log(L/P))
(37): d(U) (38): 
d(log(W))
(39): d(IM/P)
D(LNGDPPC(‐1)) ‐0.415265 0.033441 ‐0.288804 14.48425 ‐0.437554 0.018291
‐(0.3827) ‐(0.4850) ‐(0.2072) ‐(8.3400) ‐(0.3209) ‐(0.0181)
[‐1.08498] [ 0.06895] [‐1.39378] [ 1.73672] [‐1.36351] [ 1.01097]
D(LNGDPPC(‐2)) ‐0.209698 0.506889 0.064497 ‐1.258775 ‐0.576042 0.013913
‐(0.3353) ‐(0.4248) ‐(0.1815) ‐(7.3052) ‐(0.2811) ‐(0.0159)
[‐0.62550] [ 1.19319] [ 0.35536] [‐0.17231] [‐2.04935] [ 0.87790]
D(LOG(IY(‐1))) ‐0.401434 ‐0.620208 ‐0.109972 2.971453 0.195493 ‐0.003295
‐(0.1704) ‐(0.2159) ‐(0.0922) ‐(3.7125) ‐(0.1429) ‐(0.0081)
[‐2.35619] [‐2.87277] [‐1.19227] [ 0.80039] [ 1.36855] [‐0.40915]
D(LOG(IY(‐2))) ‐0.093514 ‐0.093681 0.073342 ‐4.188692 0.156452 0.002723
‐(0.1376) ‐(0.1743) ‐(0.0745) ‐(2.9973) ‐(0.1153) ‐(0.0065)
[‐0.67985] [‐0.53747] [ 0.98488] [‐1.39750] [ 1.35659] [ 0.41885]
D(LOG(EMPFTE(‐1) 0.349753 1.918865 0.72877 ‐33.12247 0.442839 0.035252
*HOURS(‐1)/P(‐1))) ‐(0.5653) ‐(0.7163) ‐(0.3060) ‐(12.3172) ‐(0.4739) ‐(0.0267)
[ 0.61875] [ 2.67893] [ 2.38143] [‐2.68912] [ 0.93439] [ 1.31927]
D(LOG(EMPFTE(‐2) ‐1.397086 ‐0.562236 ‐0.542063 26.29069 0.442728 0.032267
*HOURS(‐2)/P(‐2))) ‐(0.5975) ‐(0.7572) ‐(0.3235) ‐(13.0205) ‐(0.5010) ‐(0.0283)
[‐2.33807] [‐0.74254] [‐1.67564] [ 2.01917] [ 0.88369] [ 1.14233]
D(U_INT(‐1)) ‐0.028163 ‐0.038096 ‐0.008502 0.395813 ‐0.001132 0.000751
‐(0.0123) ‐(0.0156) ‐(0.0067) ‐(0.2689) ‐(0.0104) ‐(0.0006)
[‐2.28242] [‐2.43647] [‐1.27272] [ 1.47214] [‐0.10945] [ 1.28728]
D(U_INT(‐2)) ‐0.006075 ‐0.018506 0.003526 ‐0.2124 ‐0.003275 0.000123
‐(0.0100) ‐(0.0127) ‐(0.0054) ‐(0.2179) ‐(0.0084) ‐(0.0005)
[‐0.60737] [‐1.46024] [ 0.65125] [‐0.97461] [‐0.39059] [ 0.26058]
D(LOG(W(‐1))) 0.126322 0.445314 0.086206 ‐6.286202 0.306072 0.01109
‐(0.2118) ‐(0.2683) ‐(0.1146) ‐(4.6140) ‐(0.1775) ‐(0.0100)
[ 0.59657] [ 1.65964] [ 0.75200] [‐1.36241] [ 1.72400] [ 1.10792]
D(LOG(W(‐2))) 0.323506 0.93185 0.258567 ‐13.12207 0.056538 0.003541
‐(0.2407) ‐(0.3051) ‐(0.1303) ‐(5.2458) ‐(0.2019) ‐(0.0114)
[ 1.34379] [ 3.05464] [ 1.98389] [‐2.50143] [ 0.28011] [ 0.31113]
D(IM(‐1)/P(‐1)) ‐2.881048 ‐12.49259 ‐1.730107 ‐128.0447 ‐0.639202 0.430211
‐(5.2654) ‐(6.6721) ‐(2.8506) ‐(114.7340) ‐(4.4147) ‐(0.2489)
[‐0.54717] [‐1.87236] [‐0.60693] [‐1.11601] [‐0.14479] [ 1.72841]
D(IM(‐2)/P(‐2)) ‐5.485346 ‐8.066979 ‐1.51369 ‐15.15805 ‐5.779723 0.136395
‐(5.1585) ‐(6.5366) ‐(2.7927) ‐(112.4040) ‐(4.3250) ‐(0.2439)
[‐1.06337] [‐1.23412] [‐0.54202] [‐0.13485] [‐1.33634] [ 0.55934]
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The details for the regression underlying Figure 7 are as follows. 
  
Dependent Variable: log(L/P). Method: Least Squares. Period: 1973-2009. HAC standard errors & 
covariance (Bartlett kernel, Andrews bandwidth = 0.8746)      
  
Variable   Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
C   -1.411231  0.344680 -4.094324 0.0004 
LOG(L(-1)/P(-1)) 0.809340  0.060230 13.43750 0.0000 
D(LOG(IY(-1)))  0.109717  0.051083 2.147826 0.0416 
D(LOG(IY(-2)))  0.201977  0.044276 4.561820 0.0001 
LNGDPPC(-1)  0.084866  0.018631 4.555228 0.0001 
D(LNGDPPC(-2)) 0.210145  0.133543 1.573618 0.1281 
LOG(IY(-1))  0.146983  0.054929 2.675857 0.0130 
D(LOG(L(-2)/P(-2))) -0.765533  0.202438 -3.781568 0.0009 
PDL01   1.342988  0.698558 1.922515 0.0660 
PDL02   -0.275587  0.240278 -1.146951 0.2623 
PDL03   -0.071817  0.061504 -1.167675 0.2540 
PDL04   0.006301  0.013445 0.468690 0.6434 
      
Adjusted R-squared: 0.97. Durbin-Watson stat: 1.73. 
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